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This study used fMRI to investigate the neural substrates of moral cognition in
health resource allocation decision problems. In particular, it investigated the
cognitive and emotional processes that underpin utilitarian approaches to health
care rationing such as Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs). Participants viewed
hypothetical medical and nonmedical resource allocation scenarios which described
equal or unequal allocation of resources to different groups. In addition, partici-
pants were assigned to 1 of 2 treatments in which they either did or did not receive
advanced instructions about the principles of utilitarianism. In all cases, partici-
pants were asked to judged the proposed allocations as “fair” or “unfair.” More
brain activity was observed within the superior parietal lobe, angular gyrus, middle
temporal gyrus, and bilateral caudate nucleus when participants viewed scenarios
depicting equal divisions of resources. Conversely, unequal resource divisions were
associated with more activity in the inferior frontal gyrus and insula cortex.
Furthermore, instructions about the principles of utilitarianism led to significant
activation differences within the inferior frontal gyrus and the middle frontal gyrus.
Significant differences in activity were also found within the inferior frontal cortex
and anterior insula between medical and nonmedical scenarios. The implications
for cognitive control mechanisms and the cognitive and neural bases of utilitarian
ethical judgment are discussed.
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How to divide limited public resources for
health care fairly among a population is a major
moral and political issue in all countries around
the world. Research has shown that people are
attentive to perceived breaches of individual
rights to treatment when asked to make health
care rationing decisions for themselves (Anand
& Walloo, 2000). In contrast, utilitarian per-
spectives argue that the ‘rational’ way in health
care resource allocation is not to heavily weight
universal rights, but to allocate resources which
maximize the widest public good.
Neuroscientific research into moral cognition
has emphasized the importance of both emotion
and cognition in forming choices, although to
date techniques of neuroscience and neuropsy-
chology have not been applied to understanding
health care rationing decision making (Ciara-
melli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moll, de
Oliveira-Souza & Eslinger, 2003; Moll, Es-
linger & de Oliveira-Souza, 2001; Moll et al.,
2002; Moll & de Oliveira-Souza, 2007; Young
& Koenigs, 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007). As well
as being of interest in its own right, the question
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of the extent to which brain areas involved in
emotion and cognitive control contribute to
such decision making might potentially inform
the reason why people make the choices they do
in these context. In the present study, we use
functional MRI (fMRI) to examine how brain
regions involved in decision making, cognition,
and emotion are recruited in health care ration-
ing decision making.
Utilitarianism, or more specifically ‘Act Util-
itarianism,’ is a moral framework which pro-
poses that one should choose actions that yield
at least as high a utility as the sum total of
utilities of any other alternative act (Bentham,
1789). This moral framework has been highly
influential within economics and has given rise
to the use of a QALY (Quality Adjusted Life
Year) maximization rule by economists work-
ing on issues to do with health. Quality of life
factors include loss of function and mobility
and the enjoyment one can derive from life
after resources have been allocated (Cubbon,
1991). In essence, the expected QALY benefit
of a medical intervention is the measure of its
average value and the set of interventions
which should be funded according to utilitar-
ianism is that which maximizes the total gain
in QALYs by a society (Appleby, Devlin, &
Parkin, 2007).
However, utilitarian resource allocation has
been criticized by philosophers concerned
about justice and distributional aspects of
fairness within a “Rawlsian” perspective
(Rawls, 1971). According to Rawls each per-
son has an equal right to the most extensive
basic liberty (greatest liberty principle) and
inequalities are only permitted if they benefit
all persons. For something to be just or fair it
must not violate principles of liberty or equal-
ity. Utilitarianism permits distributional in-
equalities if they serve the general interest in
contrast to the egalitarian stance of justice
outlined by Rawls.
QALY maximization is perceived by some as
condemning people who are not ‘cost-effective’
to society if their care does not produce enough
medical benefit. If all other things are equal, the
QALY approach could prioritize the health of
someone who already has a high health status.
A person who is disabled will be viewed as
having a poorer long term quality of life and so
any QALY score they obtain for treatment will
be inevitably lower than that of a healthy per-
son. Some philosophers (e.g., Harris, 1987,
1995, 2005) object to the use of QALYs on this
basis, arguing that it puts such chronically ill or
disabled persons in a sort of ‘double jeopardy.’
Not only do they suffer a misfortune by becom-
ing disabled or otherwise disadvantaged in the
first instance, they are as a result given a lower
priority in their health care. Empirical research
also demonstrates that people do not make de-
cisions consistent with QALYs (Anand & Wal-
loo, 2000). It has been suggested that the QALY
approach fails to account for real choice behav-
ior because it does not reflect the moral beliefs
held by ordinary members of the public who
often see the results of QALY decision making
frameworks as violating claims based on human
rights or social contracts (Anand & Walloo,
2000).
In contrast to moral decision-making frame-
works such as utilitarianism and QALYs which
emphasizes rational calculation, research in
cognitive neuroscience emphasizes the contri-
bution of emotion to decision making in real
social situations (e.g., Bechara & Damasio,
2005). Analysis of brain activity via fMRI dur-
ing economic “games” and moral decision mak-
ing tasks reveals interacting networks of activa-
tion within prefrontal and subcortical structures
associated with value formation, cognition and
emotion. For example, Sanfey, Rilling, Aron-
son, Nystrom, and Cohen (2003) used fMRI to
measure brain activity in the ‘ultimatum game,’
in which two players are given the opportunity
to split a sum of money: one player acts as the
proposer and the responder must either accept
or reject the offer. Traditional economic theory
would predict that the proposer should offer the
smallest sum of money possible and that the
responder should accept on the premise that
some money is preferable to none. The bilateral
anterior insula, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC), and anterior cingulate cortex gener-
ate greater activation in responder’s brains for
unfair compared with fair offers. The insula in
particular has been associated with the experi-
ence of disgust, an emotion that has been con-
jectured to play an important role in moral de-
cision making (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, &
Imada, 1997; Moll et al., 2005).
Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, and Cohen
(2004) used fMRI to study variants of the clas-
sic “trolley car” problem. In the original version
of this problem, participants were asked to
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make a hypothetical decision to save 5 lives in
a runaway trolley car at the cost of sacrificing
one individual by pulling a lever to divert the
train onto an alternative track. In the “bridge
variant,” the 5 lives can only be saved by push-
ing a fat man off a bridge into the path of the
train. Green et al. found that brain areas asso-
ciated with emotion and cognition exhibited
higher levels of activation for personal moral
judgments (e.g., the bridge variant problem)
versus impersonal moral judgments. More dif-
ficult personal moral judgments showed in-
creasing activity in the DLPFC and the ACC.
By contrast, increased activity was found in the
DLPFC only for impersonal moral judgments
which resembled utilitarian decisions.
Based on these findings, Green and col-
leagues argued that difficult personal moral
judgments involve a conflict between cognitive
and emotional processes. They proposed a ‘dual
process’ model of moral cognition in which
personal moral judgments are driven by social
emotional processes and impersonal moral
judgments are more cognitive in nature.
Subsequent work has also suggested that util-
itarian moral judgments are driven by con-
trolled cognitive processes, whereas nonutilitar-
ian judgments are driven by automatic
emotional responses (Greene, 2007). Greene,
Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, and Cohen
(2008) presented participants with personal and
impersonal moral dilemmas either under cogni-
tive load (digit search task) or a control condi-
tion (no cognitive load). They found that utili-
tarian judgments were significantly slower than
nonutilitarian judgments under cognitive load.
Greene and colleagues argue that this provides
direct evidence for their view that utilitarian
judgments are driven by controlled cognitive
processes, whereas nonutilitarian judgments are
driven by automatic (more emotional/affective)
reasoning processes. In other research, it has
been found that patients with lesions of the
ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) pro-
duced an abnormally high rate of utilitarian
judgments in cases which required the individ-
ual to overcome an emotional response to the
direct harming of others (Koenigs et al., 2007).
These patients also exhibited more normal judg-
ments for impersonal situations, suggesting that
the VMPFC is a crucial brain structure for the
mediation of moral judgments that involve
emotionally salient actions.
Based on these previous investigations of
non– health care decision making scenarios,
we hypothesized that when people form deci-
sions based on QALY maximization princi-
ples, increased engagement of neural centers
responsible for cognitive control and reason-
ing should be observed (e.g., DLPFC). Our
rationale is that when individuals make a util-
itarian judgment, it is likely to require the
suppression of an immediate and powerful
emotional response to the perceived inter-
group inequality and breach of human rights
to health care. Conversely, it is hypothesized
that when people make decisions which go
against QALY maximization, and choose not
to allocate resources to those with greater
expected utilities, then this will be associated
with enhanced neural responses associated
with emotions (e.g., anterior insula). More-
over, as health care rationing might be consid-
ered a particularly personal moral dilemma, en-
hanced activity in emotional centers and more
Rawlsian or rights-based decision making
should be seen in such problems. This study
investigated these hypotheses using fMRI scan-
ning while participants considered a series of
hypothetical resource allocation split scenarios.
In each scenario, they indicated with a button
press whether they considered them to be “fair”
or “unfair.”
Method
Participants
Thirty participants were recruited from ad-
vertisements placed within the University of
Exeter campus and from internal mailing lists.
Participants were paid 10 pounds and were aged
between 19 and 36 years (M  26; 5 male, 25
female). Ethical approval was obtained from the
University of Exeter School of Psychology eth-
ics committee. Exclusion criteria specified were
major medical illness (e.g., congenital abnor-
malities, heart problems, cancer) neurological
disorders (e.g., Seizures, Head Injury), or metal
fragments/implants which make MRI contrain-
dicated.
Half the participants received instructions
about utilitarian/QALY decision making frame-
works as part of the information and consent
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procedure1 (QALY Instructed participants). The
other group received no advanced briefing on
utilitarian decision making (Uninstructed
group).
Task and Materials
The experimental task involved the presenta-
tion of 60 stimulus slides which required par-
ticipants to make a button press response to
indicate whether they considered a resource al-
location/‘split’ of money between two social
groups (defined by QALY relevant factors) to
be either fair or unfair. A control task involved
judgments about how correctly (or “fairly”) a
horizontal bar indicated a stated quantitative
split of a commodity. Stimuli used in the fMRI
study were designed using Microsoft Power-
Point and then exported into “jpg” format at
1024  768 pixel resolution. Each scenario
screen was displayed for up to 20 seconds,
followed by presentation of a fixation cross for
a variable period of 3 to 12 seconds. Partici-
pants viewed the stimuli in the scanner via a
mirror mounted on the head coil and a back
projection screen located at the foot of the scan-
ner. Responses were made using a fiber optic
response key box. Custom written C-software
was used to display the image, record responses
and control stimulus timing via a laptop PC in
the scanner control room.
A horizontal bar in the stimulus screen was
designed to graphically represent the hypothet-
ical allocation of resources (always a split of
£10 million) to two groups who differed on
QALY relevant factors (i.e., married versus non
married, children versus no children, high ver-
sus low income, and old versus young). The
stimulus set of 60 slides contained, for every
participant, 20 Medical scenarios, 20 Nonmed-
ical scenarios, and 20 Control scenarios. The
Medical scenarios were organized into two
groups: Group A (depression, diabetes, liver
disease, dementia, cancer) and Group B (HIV,
asthma, epilepsy, influenza, heart disease). The
Nonmedical scenarios comprised Group A (bas-
ketball lessons, super high speed internet, uni-
versity tuition fees, housing benefit and cycling
proficiency lessons) and Group B (driving les-
sons, computer tuition, cookery lessons, road-
side assistance and public transport passes) with
participants viewing scenarios selected from
only one Medical and one Nonmedical group in
each cases. The control scenarios were always
static across participants: quantity of chocolate
versus carrot cakes, weight of two parcels, goals
scored by a football team, size of two office
buildings, number of students in two lecture
classes.
Content for Medical scenarios was based on
similar scenarios used in Anand and Walloo
(2000). Content for Nonmedical scenarios were
selected to include interventions which added to
overall quality of life while not directly impact-
ing on health and longevity (e.g., having a full
driving license leads to increased social mobil-
ity). The scenarios were also subject to a pilot
study in which participants were asked to spec-
ify the division of resources they viewed as fair
for a variety of scenarios. Control scenarios
were chosen to reflect familiar everyday con-
structs not related to moral judgments in any
way. Examples of screens presented to partici-
pants in the scanner are shown in Figure 1.
Each slide differed in the amount of resources
allocated to the groups and resource allocation
was either (a) in favor of ‘high’ QALY groups
(70/30 split or 60/40 split), (b) was equal (50/
50), or (c) in favor of ‘low’ QALY groups
(40/60, 30/70). Participants were told that the
number of people falling into each category
(e.g., old v young) was equal. Decisions in favor
of ‘high’ QALY groups were therefore consid-
ered ‘utilitarian’ and decisions in favor of equal
splits or ‘low’ QALY groups were considered
‘nonutilitarian.’
During the task the images displayed to
participants were selected from one of five
stimulus sets. The sets differed in that the
same split (i.e., 70/30) was never combined
with the same scenario (i.e., cancer treatment)
1 Instruction text read by these participants was as fol-
lows: “Utilitarianism is the philosophical perspective that
moral/ethical decisions should be made with the aim of
maximizing the greatest good or ‘utility’ to the greatest
number of people. This approach is often applied to deci-
sions in health care provision such that those that are likely
to gain the most from, for example, a new drug treatment
are given priority. Calculations can be based on so called
quality adjusted life years (QALYs), which calculate the
likely life expectancy of an individual multiplied by their
quality of life. For example, someone who is married should
be prioritized for treatment as on average they have a better
quality of life and live longer. Similarly, those who have
children, younger people and people who are financially
better off would have a higher QALY score than those
without children, older people or less well off individuals.”
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across sets. Within these sets the presentation
of the stimulus slides were randomized across
participants.
Design and Procedure
A 2  5  2 mixed factorial design was
employed. The repeated measures independent
variables were Distribution of resources or
‘splits’ which had five levels, 70/30, 60/40, 50/
50, 40/60, 30/70, and Scenario type, which had
two levels, Medical or Nonmedical, with a be-
tween-group factor of Participant Instructions
(whether or not instructions about QALY max-
imization were given to participants). The de-
pendent variables measured were ethical stand-
point (i.e., was the fair allocation judged to be
Figure 1. Examples of Control, Medical, and Nonmedical choice scenarios presented to
participants. Three QALY relevant medical scenarios are presented in the right panel of the
figure. Two QALY relevant Nonmedical scenarios are presented in the top two left panels of
the figure. An example of a control scenario is presented in the bottom left panel. See the
online article for the color version of this figure.
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the utilitarian distribution or the nonutilitarian
distribution) and the pattern of neural activity
observed in the brain via the measurement of
fMRI/Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent
(BOLD) signal response.
Informed consent was sought from each par-
ticipant who also completed a safety checklist
and received a set of written instructions for the
task and screen shot of an example scenario.
Participants lay face up in the scanner with
cushions placed around their head to improve
stability. Participants held a two-button re-
sponse pad in their right hand and were in-
structed to press the left button if they felt the
allocation of resources in each scenario was
‘fair’ or the right button if they felt it was
‘unfair.’ Between each screen a fixation cross
was presented. After the completion of the
fMRI session, participants read a debrief form
explaining the rationale and background to the
study.
fMRI Data Acquisition
A total of 455 Whole Brain 3D Echo Planar
images were acquired as the participant per-
formed the task using the Phillips 1.5T Gy-
roscan whole body Intera scanner at the Exeter
MRI Research Centre, University of Exeter,
U.K. A T2-weighted echo planar sequence
(EPI) was used with the following parameters:
TR  3000ms, TE  45ms, flip angle  90
degrees, 35 transverse slices, resolution  3
mm  3 mm  3 mm. FOV  240 mm as-
cending acquisition.
fMRI Preprocessing and Analysis
Spatial preprocessing and analysis were per-
formed using SPM-8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac
.uk/spm/). Preprocessing of the data included
slice-timing correction (resliced to mean image,
interpolation 4th degree B spline), volume reg-
istration, realignment to first scan image (the 6
realignment parameter variables being added as
nuisance covariates in the 1st level statistical
model), normalization to EPI template image,
smoothing (using a 6-mm FWHM kernel, i.e.,
twice the voxel dimensions), and high pass fil-
tering (SPM default of 128 second cut-off pe-
riod used).
Each participant’s fMRI data was analyzed
using a statistical model comprising a series of
regressors derived by convolving task event on-
sets and durations with a canonical hemody-
namic response function. The GLM approach
was used to assess correlations between the
measured BOLD response and regressors of
interest. The 1st level statistical model included
regressors corresponding to the onset of the
choice screen for different resource splits for
Medical, Nonmedical, and Control scenarios,
such that for each subject, 12 different event
regressors were represented in the first level
statistical model corresponding to the follow-
ing:
Medical Scenarios with 70/30 resource split,
Medical-60/40, Medical-50/50, Medical-40/60,
Medical-30/70 Nonmedical-70/30, Nonmedical-
60/40, Nonmedical-50/50, Nonmedical-40/60,
Nonmedical-30/70, Control Fair Representa-
tion of Split, Control Unfair Representation
Split.
One-sample t tests on the statistical regres-
sors of interest were generated for each partic-
ipant and entered in the 2nd level (“random
effects”) analysis to look for statistically signif-
icant patterns of activation consistent across
participants. Decision period activity for partic-
ipants was then analyzed using a 2  2  5
factorial model with (Medical/Nonmedical),
participant instruction (received/did not receive
briefing about QALYs) and split type (70/30,
60/40, 50/50, 40/60, 30/70) as factors. Statisti-
cal contrasts, comparing equal versus unequal
splits of resources were constructed by applying
positive and negative t-contrast weightings to
the relevant regressors within the 2nd level
SPM model. Because of the previously reported
finding of a bias toward judging equality as
“fair” in health care rationing (Anand & Wal-
loo, 2000; see also behavioral analysis below),
the reported analysis focused on main and in-
teraction effects of Equal versus Unequal split
scenarios, equating to the comparison between
regressors representing trials where participants
viewed 50/50 split scenarios compared to all
other resource splits (70/30, 60/40, 40/60,
30,70). Parametric modeling of the different
levels of trial split was not used because it was
considered that the key comparison of interest
was between equality and nonequality rather
that the relative quantitative split across scenar-
ios.
Two participants were excluded from the 2nd
level fMRI factorial analysis described below
because of a large amount of missing behavioral
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data where no button press response was given
(one participant) and another for providing an
idiosyncratic response pattern (judging all sce-
narios as “fair”). Second level factorial analysis
was therefore based on results from 28 subjects.
Results are reported at p  .001 threshold un-
corrected for multiple comparisons.
Estimated Brodmann area (BA) reference
numbers and anatomical labels were generated
for each reported activation focus by first con-
verting MNI coordinates to Talaraich coordi-
nates (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) according
to the “mni2tal” transformation (www.mrc-cbu
.cam.ac.uk/Imaging/mnispace.html). These co-
ordinates were then entered into the Talaraich
Daemon database client software (Lancaster et
al., 2000) to generate relevant anatomical la-
bels.
Results
Behavioral Data
Nonutilitarian versus utilitarian decision
makers. Using a median split, participants
were classified as either ‘strong’ nonutilitarian
or ‘weak’ nonutilitarian decision makers based
upon their responses to the scenarios (consistent
with previous behavioral investigations all sub-
jects showed some bias toward nonutilitarian-
ism as evidenced by a preference for objective
equality when judging fairness). Analysis of
behavioral choices showed that more subjects
held a strong nonutilitarian “deontological” po-
sition in the subject group who were not given
information about the application of QALY
maximization to resource allocation prior to the
experiment (10/15 subjects holding a strong an-
tiutilitarian view when not given information
about QALY versus 6/15 subjects who were
given information about QALY). However, a
Pearson Chi Square showed that there was no
significant relationship between information
about QALYs given to participants during the
consent procedure and their ethical standpoint,
2(1), N  28, p  .274.
Fairness decision behavior. The propor-
tion of scenarios judged as “unfair” differed
significantly across Medical and Nonmedical
scenarios, F(1, 27)  5.72, p  .05, with par-
ticipants judging significantly more Medical
scenarios as unfair (67%) than Nonmedical sce-
narios (62%). Participants also judged signifi-
cantly more 50–50 or ‘equal splits’ as fair than
any of the utilitarian or nonutilitarian unequal
splits, F(4, 108)  47.25, p  .001. The judg-
ments of fairness differed across Medical and
Nonmedical scenarios according to the resource
allocation split, F(4, 108)  7.86, p  .001.
This interaction effect indicated that fairness
was judged differently across medical and non-
medical scenarios, F(1, 27)  23.80, p  .001
with participants showing a significantly greater
tendency to judge unequal splits as unfair in
Medical compared with Nonmedical scenarios
(see Figure 2).
Reaction times. A mixed ANOVA (2 
5  2) with ethical view (Weak versus Strong
Nonutilitarian) as a between subjects factor was
used to analyze the relationship between ethical
view, allocation of resources (‘splits’), and time
taken to process the decision (RT). Participants
were classified into ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ nonutili-
tarian positions using a median split based on
their percentage of fair/unfair judgments to de-
cisions with utilitarian weighted resource allo-
cation (see above). No significant main or in-
teraction effects were observed although there
was a trend toward a difference between partic-
ipants RTs in Medical scenarios, F(1, 28) 
3.48, p  .074. There was also no significant
main effect based upon ethical view, F(1, 25),
p  .94, ns, or interaction between ethical view
and split (70–30, 60–40, 50–50, 40–6-, 30–
70).
A further 2-way ANOVA directly compared
RTs for scenarios of equality with all those
depicting unequal splits. For this analysis the
difference between Medical and Nonmedical
scenarios did reach significance, F(1, 28) 
5.91, p  .021; Means for Medical  8871 
312 ms and Nonmedical  9359  345ms,
but there was no difference between Equal
and Unequal scenarios overall, F(1, 28) 
0.39; Means for Equal  8945  403 ms and
Unequal: 9184  314 ms, or interaction effect
between Scenario type and Split, F(1, 28) 
0.20.
Finally, we also carried out an analysis of
RTs by subject choice (Fair/Unfair). A 2-way
ANOVA with Choice and Scenario type as fac-
tor showed no significant main effect of Choice,
F(1, 27)  1.55, or Scenario, F(1, 27)  1.45,
and no significant interaction between the two
factors, F(1, 27)  1.51.
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fMRI Data
Equal versus unequal splits (main effect).
Comparison of brain activity during presenta-
tion of scenarios of equality—50/50 splits—
versus inequality (all other splits) revealed in-
creased activity for equal splits within the
angular gyrus (BA39), parietal lobe (BA7),
middle temporal gyrus (BA19), superior frontal
gyrus (BA8), precentral gyrus (BA4), and the
head of caudate nucleus (Table 1; Figure 3A).
The bilateral head of caudate locus also in-
cluded some “activated” voxels overlapping
the adjacent frontal ventricle on the standard
MNI template image (see Figure 4). These are
likely to be artifacts of the standard smooth-
ing and normalization procedures used to pro-
cess fMRI data (see discussion). No voxels
were activated during presentation of scenar-
ios with unequal as compared to equal splits
overall.
Medical versus Nonmedical decision mak-
ing (main effect). Comparison of brain activ-
ity between scenarios types (Medical/Nonmed-
ical scenarios) showed no significantly
activated voxels.
Equality versus inequality in Medical ver-
sus Nonmedical scenarios (interaction effect).
The interaction effect comparing the effect of
equality (vs. inequality) in Medical and Non-
medical scenarios revealed foci of significantly
increased activation in the right inferior frontal
gyrus (BA9/BA47), right insula (BA13), and
inferior parietal lobe (BA40; exact coordinates
are given in Table 1 and Figure 3B). To further
understand this interaction, we applied contrast
weights to either the equal or unequal split
conditions separately, for both Medical and
Nonmedical problems. We also plotted the con-
trast estimates for each of the component model
regressors in the interaction. Consistent with the
differences observed in the behavioral data, this
revealed that the source of the interaction effect
appeared to be a larger difference in activity
between Equal and Unequal splits for Medical
as compared with Nonmedical scenarios (Fig-
ure 5A).
Figure 2. Proportion of scenarios judged fair versus unfair for the two scenario types
(Medical/Nonmedical) plotted against resource allocation split. 70-30 splits represent those
judged to be more utilitarian based on QALY factors, with 30-70 splits representing a bias in
favor of groups who would be expected to have lower QALYs.
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The comparison of activity when viewing
trials depicting equality with inequality inevita-
bly compared experimental conditions which
contained unequal trial numbers (as four ver-
sions of each scenario presented different un-
equal resource splits depicted scenarios whereas
only one version depicted equality). We there-
fore repeated the interaction analysis utilizing
only trials depicting equality and those depict-
ing the most “utilitarian” split of resources,
which favored the group which might be seen to
have most to gain in terms of QALYs (e.g.,
70:30 in favor of young relative to old people),
thus ensuring an equal number of measurements
contributed to the analysis in each participant.
This supplementary analysis revealed a near
identical pattern of activity to that reported in
the main interaction analysis including the foci
in the right inferior frontal gyrus and insula
cortex.
Subject instruction (main effect). Compa-
rison of brain activity associated with subject
instruction (those who had received instructions
about QALY maximization vs. those whom had
not) showed no significantly activated voxels.
Equality and instruction (interaction
effect). The interaction effect comparing the
effect of equality (see above) for the two in-
struction groups showed significant differences
in activation to the effect of scenario equality
dependent on whether or not participants re-
ceived instructions concerning principles of
QALY maximization. Regions activated in-
cluded the inferior frontal gyrus (BA47) and
middle frontal gyrus (BA11). Exact coordinates
are given in Table 1 and illustrated in Figure
3C. As with the interaction between scenario
type and equality (see above) we applied con-
trast weights to either the Equal or Unequal split
conditions separately for Medical and Nonmed-
Table 1
Table of Peak Activation Coordinates (MNI Coordinates) and Anatomical Labels for the Statistical
Contrasts of fMRI/BOLD Signal Response Described in the Text
MNI coordinates
Contrast/region (Brodmann areas) Z score x y z
Main effect equal  unequal splits
Angular gyrus (BA39) 6.60 45 58 10
Superior parietal lobe (BA7) 6.52 18 79 34
Middle temporal gyrus (BA19) 6.13 39 79 16
Bilateral head of caudate 5.20 6 11 13
5.20 6 17 7
Pre-central gyrus (BA4) 4.66 21 25 70
Superior frontal gyrus (BA8) 4.58 12 44 52
Superior parietal lobule (BA7) 4.26 21 55 55
Pre-central gyrus (BA6) 3.85 51 4 46
Superior temporal gyrus (BA41) 3.12 42 31 16
Interaction effect between unequal  equal contrast for nonmedical
versus medical scenarios
Inferior frontal gyrus (BA9/47) 5.01 45 8 22
Insula (BA13) 4.73 39 2 4
Inferior parietal lobe (BA40) 4.09 60 37 37
Interaction effect between unequal  equal and participant instruction
group (participants briefed about QALYs or not)
Inferior frontal gyrus (BA47) 3.40 39 23 17
Middle frontal gyrus (BA11) 3.15 30 38 2
Comparison of activity between experimental versus control trials overall
Limbic lobe/posterior cingulate (BA30) 5.72 21 55 10
Caudate 5.75 21 37 16
Parietal lobe (BA7) 5.81 9 49 52
Post-central gyrus (BA47) 4.91 48 16 22
Superior frontal gyrus (BA6) 4.47 18 11 52
Medial frontal gyrus (BA9) 3.93 27 41 43
Pre-central gyrus (BA4) 3.66 48 10 52
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ical problems and plotted the contrast estimates
for each of the component model regressors in
the interaction. This showed that activity in the
inferior frontal gyrus and middle frontal gyrus
was increased for scenarios of inequality in the
Instructed subject group (Figure 5B). As for the
interaction effect by scenario type above, this
analysis was repeated including only trials de-
picting either equality or 70:30 splits in favor of
high QALY gain groups. This showed a similar
locus of activity in the right inferior frontal
gyrus as well additional loci within the left
inferior and anterior cingulate gyrus (BA32).
Comparison by ethical view. A separate
statistical model comparison of brain activity
showed no significant main or interaction effect
on brain activation between those who were
classified as Weak versus Strong Nonutilitarian
decision makers (see Behavioral Data above).
Experimental versus control trial compa-
rison. The main effect comparison of Exper-
imental versus Control trials overall revealed
Figure 3. (A) Significant regions of activity for scenarios describing equal relative to
unequal resource splits (main effect of equality; color bar shows t statistic for all images). (B)
Increased activity observed in inferior frontal cortex/insula cortex region to unequal scenarios
for Nonmedical relative to Medical scenarios (Equality by Scenario type interaction effect).
(C) Area of inferior frontal cortex showing increased activation when viewing unequal
scenarios (Medical and Nonmedical) for participants given instructions explaining principles
of QALY/Utilitarian decision making relative to those who were not (Interaction effect
between equality and Instruction group). Color Bars indicate t statistic for each contrast
displayed. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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widespread activation for both comparisons of
scenarios depicting equal and unequal splits of
resources or commodities, including enhanced
activity for the experimental condition in re-
gions including the limbic lobe and posterior
cingulate (BA30), parietal lobe (BA7), temporal
lobe, and frontal lobe (BA6, BA4 and BA9; see
Table 1).
Discussion
Key Findings
The key finding of the current study was that
under conditions for which participants more
often judged unequal splits of resources as
“fair,” relative increases in activity were seen in
brain areas linked to cognitive control processes
including the DLPFC, inferior frontal cortex
(IFC), and anterior cingulate gyrus. Specifi-
cally, a greater difference in activation between
unequal and equal splits of resources was seen
in the right IFC and DLPFC (BA47 & BA9) for
medical scenarios, compared with nonmedical
ones. Inspection of the contrast estimates for
this interaction effect suggests a relative deac-
tivation in these regions during viewing of med-
ical scenarios depicting uneven allocation of
resources to different patient groups, but no
difference in BOLD signal in this region depen-
dent on resource split for Nonmedical scenarios
(Figure 5A).
Implications for Accounts of Moral
Decision Making
One interpretation of these results is that
making utilitarian judgments recruits brain re-
gions in the frontal cortex associated with cog-
nitive control functions and that there may be
more sustained engagement of these regions
during consideration of Nonmedical compared
with Medical scenarios and for participants who
received prior instruction about QALY based
decision making. An explanation for this ob-
served interaction effect might be that cognitive
control systems are disrupted by presentation of
scenarios perceived to breach ethical and social
norms of equality of access to health care. This
is consistent with the accompanying behavioral
data, which replicated the previously reported
bias for individuals to judge only equal resource
splits as fair, particularly in medical scenarios.
In these contexts, cognitive control may be less
engaged and participants might be more likely,
as a result, to judge unequal allocations of re-
sources as unfair.
The right IFC region highlighted in the present
study has been strongly implicated in cognitive
control processes. The role of the IFC in cognitive
control has been investigated predominantly using
the Go/No-Go paradigm to test response inhibi-
tion where the index of inhibitory control is the
number of errors made when an individual makes
a button press response to a trial they should not
(Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004). The IFC be-
comes activated during these trials of response
inhibition (Konishi et al., 1999; Liddle, Kiehl, &
Smith, 2001; Menon, Adl3eman, White, Glover,
& Reiss, 2001; Rubia, Smith, Brammer, & Taylor,
2003). Moreover, damage to the right inferior
frontal gyrus leads to disruption in stop-signal
cued response inhibition (Aron, Fletcher, Bull-
more, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003). Maturation of
this area is also related to response inhibition, with
a significant relationship between speed of inhibi-
tion and age (Tamm, Menon, & Reiss, 2002). The
inhibitory control functions of this region have
also been shown to extend across motor response
Figure 4. Zoomed axial and coronal views of a statistical
parametric map overlay image (left), alongside the same
sectional views of a T1 MNI standardized brain image
without the overlay (right) for the contrast of scenarios
depicting Equality  Inequality. Voxels fulfilling p  .001
uncorrected for multiple comparisons statistical threshold
are shown located in the grey matter of the head of caudate
nucleus bilaterally. See the online article for the color ver-
sion of this figure.
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modalities (Hodgson et al., 2007; Aron et al.,
2004).
The IFC has previously been shown to play a
role in social cognition and has been implicated
in the ability to predict the intentions of others
(Brunet, Sarfarti, Hardy-Bayle, & Decety,
2000). Using TMS to induce temporary lesions,
it has also been shown that the left inferior
frontal gyrus plays a role in social perception
(Keuken et al., 2011). There are direct connec-
tions between the IFC and the medial prefrontal
cortex, an area involved in self-other represen-
tations and has been suggested that this pathway
facilitates integration of information necessary
Figure 5. Contrast estimate plots for peak activation voxels in the inferior frontal gyrus for
the interaction effect contrasts shown in Figure 3 and Table 1 (MNI coordinates shown).
Vertical scale approximates to mean Beta coefficients fitted to the BOLD signal data for each
trial/event regressor within the first level SPM analysis. (A) Contrast estimates for Medical
and Nonmedical scenarios depicting Equal and Unequal splits of resources. (B) Contrast
estimates for participants who were instructed or uninstructed in QALY decision making.
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for self-other representations (Uddin, Iacoboni,
Lange, & Keenan, 2007). Further support for
the role of the IFC in social cognition has been
shown by the involvement of this region in
more removed forms of social cognition such as
the watching of movie clips depicting everyday
social interactions (Iacoboni et al., 2004) or
during responses to incongruent cues in social
stimuli for example, press left when a face
showed a rightward directed gaze (Schilbach et
al., 2011).
The current results are only partially consis-
tent with previously outlined “dual process”
accounts of moral judgment and decision mak-
ing (Greene, 2007). Earlier studies have empha-
sized the anterior cingulate region and the
DLPFC as implementing cognitive control over
prepotent emotional response (Greene et al.,
2004). The current results indicate that the rel-
ative contribution of the IFC region to decision
making processes also needs to be considered in
such contexts. The behavioral bias of partici-
pants to judge only objective equality as fair
also suggests that learned social rules and norms
(i.e., “Rawlsian” ideas of fairness) may be im-
portant in shaping peoples judgment of health
care resource rationing as are emotional sys-
tems. As well as suppressing a conflicting emo-
tional response, cognitive control systems may
also need to be engaged to suppress a neural
response to violations of prevalent social values
and norms in such scenarios (Hodgson, Guala,
Miller, Summers, 2012) to implement more
utilitarian decision making frameworks.
The activation observed during judgments of
fairness in the IFC region was centered on
BA47 but also extended rostrally and dorsally
into other lateral frontal areas including BA11
and BA9 (i.e., DLPFC). Activation was also
observed in the adjacent anterior insula during
the task for the comparison of Medical scenar-
ios compared with Nonmedical scenarios. It is
worth noting that the insula has been previously
implicated in social decision making and par-
ticularly in mediating the emotion of social dis-
gust (Sanfey et al., 2003; Phillips et al., 1997;
Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 2003; Calder,
Keane, Manes, Antoun, & Young, 2000; Carr,
Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003;
Wright, He, Shapira, Goodman, & Liu, 2004).
Further work would be needed to characterize
participants’ emotional responses to confirm
that disgust plays a critical role in guiding par-
ticipants’ responses in the current experiment.
An alternative explanation is that insula activity
in this context represents empathetic pain re-
sponse in participants’ accompanying the per-
ceived social injustice depicted in the scenario
(Gu et al., 2012). Nonetheless, the fMRI results
suggest that there may be something special
about the processing of medical scenarios de-
picting unequal resource splits which modulates
activity in the insula region.
Another region that showed differential acti-
vation in response to equality versus inequality
in the present study was an anterior temporal
lobe region around the middle temporal gyrus
(see Table 1). Other research has shown the
middle temporal gyrus to be activated in social
contexts for example when subjects empathize
with victims of crime (Farrow et al., 2001).
Other studies have implicated this region in the
representation of abstract conceptual knowl-
edge of social behaviors (Zahn et al., 2007), and
it has been proposed to form part of a wide-
spread neuronal network that supports social
cognition by providing access to social concepts
or rules (Ross & Olson, 2010).
Interestingly, other research has shown that
moral choices and preferences are subject to
variation dependent upon the form and context
within which a question is presented (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1981). Our findings indicate that
the instructions given to participants about the
basis of utilitarian decision making and QALYs
can influence their choices and modify brain
activity (Figure 3C). Nord (1995) has demon-
strated “framing effects” in a person trade-off
scenario in which social value is estimated by
asking people to state the number of outcomes
of one kind they consider equal in social value
to another kind. One direction for future re-
search in the area would be to further investi-
gate framing effects in health care resource al-
location decision making within a neuroethical
perspective. Another interesting study which
could further investigate the role of cognitive
control and inhibitory processing would be to
provide participants with a secondary cognitive
task while they perform similar judgments to
those used here. Previous work has indicated
that providing participants with an additional
cognitive load during decision making may dis-
rupt utilitarian decision making, leading to
quicker response times and reduced cognitive
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control over decision making (Greene et al.,
2008).
Limitations and Criticisms
This is a pioneering but relatively small-scale
fMRI study of moral choice in health care de-
cision making. As such it is important to discuss
the limitations and criticisms of the study design
and analysis.
The choice of control task used can be criti-
cized. We designed the control task to be a close
match with the experimental task in terms of the
visual properties of the screen and the motor
action to be given by the participant (left or
right button press). Other aspects of the control
trials were designed to be very different from
the experimental task, with participants being
required to make a judgment as to whether the
bar indicator matched the written description of
a quantitative split of a commodity. In this
respect, control trials lacked any demands on
emotional and moral decision making and
placed minimal cognitive demands on the par-
ticipant. We acknowledge that other forms of
control task could have been used, and the one
used here may be considered to be too different
to the experimental condition to provide a use-
ful comparison. However, it is important to note
that for trial/event related fMRI designs such as
used here, the effective baseline for compari-
sons of activity with experimental trials is brain
activity during null periods between the deci-
sion screen onsets. Most of the contrasts of
interest reported reflect direct comparisons be-
tween experimental trial types which were
closely matched other than in a single variable
and were independent of activity elicited by the
control task.
Another aspect of the task which should be
noted is that participants always indicated their
attribution of fairness or unfairness by pressing
the left or the right response key on a button box
held in their dominant (right hand) and the
mapping of finger to choice was not counter
balanced across participants. It is conceivable
therefore that some aspects of the results might
arise from activation differences associated
with the movement of the index and middle
finger rather than processing of the presented
scenario. However, no activation differences
were found in the primary motor cortex for any
of the contrasts of fair versus unfair judgments
and the reported analysis of activity was fo-
cused on the epoch before response execution
rather than after the response. Further, the most
interesting aspect of the results were interaction
effects which could not be simply explained by
any confounding effect of preparatory motor
activity. Overall, therefore, it seems very un-
likely that this minor feature of the design had
an effect on the results.
The analysis of fMRI data used the general
linear model (GLM) approach. Although this is
the most common statistical technique for ana-
lyzing fMRI data, it has been criticized for
being too rigid, with minor mis-modeling re-
sulting in material loss of statistical power
(Lindquist, 2008). These issues apply to most
fMRI work at present and call either for the use
of larger samples or more advanced analysis
techniques (see for instance a Bayesian ap-
proach developed by Woolrich, Behrens, Beck-
mann, Jenkinson, & Smith, 2004). However, a
specific statistical issue affecting interpretation
of the present experiment is the low number of
trials presented for some conditions of interest
(e.g., four medical scenarios depicting equality
per participant). The number of stimulus pre-
sentations was limited to minimize the amount
of time participants spent in the scanner and to
ensure that participants attended to the task
throughout (total task length was 28 minutes
and total time in scanner per subject was around
40–45 minutes). Although it is more common
practice to average fMRI data over more trials,
there is no commonly accepted minimum num-
ber of trials per condition or participants for
effective fMRI investigations, with some stud-
ies having successfully measured the BOLD
response to single trials in single subjects (Posse
et al., 2001; Mechelli, Price, Henson, & Friston,
2003). The minimum number of trials required
to measure a given BOLD response depends on
the size of the effect to be measured, together
with the number of participants tested and the
inherent variability of the measured signal (all
of which factor together to determine the statis-
tical power of a given study).
Neuroimaging also requires that individual
brain images are transformed into a standard-
ized brain space such that data can be aver-
aged across subjects with different brain di-
mensions and morphology. Spatial smoothing
of signals reduces artifactual signal noise but
places further constraints on the spatial accu-
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racy of the technique. These preprocessing
techniques can lead to potential errors in pre-
cisely coregistering activity within specific
anatomical substrates, particularly for small
and closely adjacent regions. This is the most
likely explanation for the artifactual “activa-
tion” of a small number of voxels in the
frontal ventricles adjacent to the caudate nu-
clei in the present study (see Figure 4).
A different source of general concern about
applying fMRI to moral and ethical situations is
highlighted by Schleim and Schirmann (2011),
who argue that the normative implications and
uncertainties are too readily ignored or disre-
garded by some when discussing neuroimaging
research. They propose that the findings of
fMRI studies do not by themselves yield nor-
mative implications, that is, prescribe how one
ought to act. It should also be noted that there is
a strong “reverse inference” problem underly-
ing interpretation of neuroimaging in such con-
texts. Even relatively well-evidenced claims
about functions mediated by particular brain
areas (e.g., IFC mediates cognitive inhibitory
control) are still subject to debate and discus-
sion within cognitive neuroscience. Brain imag-
ing data cannot therefore necessarily be viewed
as a more objective/definitive a line of enquiry
as other approaches. The neuro-ethical perspec-
tive offered here cannot resolve the ongoing
debates between libertarians and egalitarian the-
orists but offers an interesting framework within
which to think about the issues (Casebeer &
Churchland, 2003; Braveman & Gruskin, 2003;
Sandel, 2009; Friesen, 2001; Leary, 1994).
Finally, it should be noted that all of our
participants were young (aged between 16 and
36), native English speakers studying or work-
ing in the U.K. Therefore the behavioral deci-
sions and accompanying neural activity in these
participants might be quite different in partici-
pants with experience of different health care
systems, social group/identity characteristics,
and cultural values.
Concluding Remarks
This is the first study to use fMRI to inves-
tigate moral fairness decision making judg-
ments in health care resource allocation scenar-
ios. Consistent with previous work using purely
behavioral measures (Anand & Walloo, 2000),
we found evidence for an egalitarian decision
making bias in medical treatment rationing sce-
narios. Differences in brain activity in response
to presentation of equal versus unequal splits of
resources in medical and nonmedical scenarios
were observed which provide indicators of the
mechanism underlying the behavioral bias to-
ward objective equality observed in participants
in judgments of fairness. A particular role for
the inferior frontal cortex (IFC) is suggested in
overriding the bias toward judging only objec-
tively equal resource splits as fair, whereas
heightened activation of the insula may indicate
a reaction of disgust toward breaches of social
norms or empathetic pain evoked by perceived
inequality in other social groups’ access to
health care.
The current study should be seen as making a
small contribution to a question of very large
global socioeconomic importance. As such we
have taken care to list the methodological and
analytical limitations and criticisms of the
study. However, as an initial investigation of the
biological mechanisms underlying human deci-
sion making in this area we hope the work may
prompt new ways of thinking about fairness and
inequality that could be value to economists and
philosophers alike.
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